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BOOKS REVIEWED
Land Transfer and Finance: Cases and Materials. By Allan Axeirod, Curtis
J. Berger and Quintin Johnstone. Boston: Little Brown and Company. 1971
Pp. xxx, 986. $16.00.
The pressure for change in legal education has many dimensions, several of
which cut across the entire law school program-for example, evaluation of clini-
cal education, teaching, grading and examination methods. Often, however, the
crisis has arisen within a particular subject area. Perhaps, teaching of property
law, more than any other subject, has been plagued by an outlook and content
which has remained literally medieval to a degree that has left too many young
lawyers inadequately prepared to advise clients in modern property transactions.
Less concern with wild animals, fee tail, the Rule in Shelley's Case and more
attention to the Uniform Probate Code and real estate syndication would pro-
duce law school graduates with a better understanding of modern property con-
cepts.1
Teachers and students who share these views will probably be cheering one of
the latest entries in the property casebook sweepstakes,2 Land Transfer and
Finance by Professors Axelrod (Rutgers), Berger (Columbia) and Johnstone
(Yale). Its organization and contents represent a sharp departure from standard
practices. This may be troublesome to otherwise sympathetic teachers who may
not be able to squeeze the book into their property curriculum without a general
overhaul, which, of course, requires a consensus within the property faculty at
each school. Though not expressly so labeled, the book functions as a sequel to
Professor Berger's own Land Ownership and Use (1969). The latter, which is
intended as an introduction to property for first-year students, covers estates in
land, landlord-tenant, and private and public land allocation devices. The major
missing ingredient, called "conveyancing" by Professor Berger, is reserved for an
advanced course when students would be better prepared to grapple with the
finance, tax and contract aspects of modem land transactions. The Axelrod-
Berger-Johnstone book, the subject of this review, is intended for use in such a
course. While it includes materials not found in typical real property books, the
main section (running from pp. 240 to 818) covers land contracts, deeds, bound-
aries, priorities and land title assurance-all of which are traditionally found in
the first-year real property books. In other words, significant duplication will re-
sult if the usual real property book is followed in a later course with complete
1. While the remainder of this review is necessarily confined by the contents of the prin-
cipal book to the subject of commercial real property transactions, the textual comment is
intended to convey the reviewer's conclusion that the problem reaches into the area of gra-
tuitous transfers of property and the content of trusts and estates courses.
2. A possible alternative, not yet used by this reviewer, is G. Lefcoe, Land Development
Law: Cases and Materials (1966).
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use of the principal book. To be sure, many property teachers will prefer the more
modem coverage of the conveyancing subject. Nevertheless, its use requires either
reliance on the earlier Berger book or jettisoning a substantial hunk of the stan-
dard works and then using the principal book to cover conveyancing, probably
in the second or third year.3 This reviewer has adopted the book for his course
at Tulane Law School in common law real estate transactions, which is taken
almost exclusively by fourth semester students who have previously had five
semester hours of property. (My colleague who is responsible for these courses
presently uses the introductory Berger book plus supplementary materials.)
Teachers who find a spot in their property curriculum for this book should find,
as this reviewer has, a splendid teaching tool with several advantages and no
serious drawbacks.
Consumers of legal education easily accept the general necessity for subdivid-
ing the study of law into subject areas which are consciously interrelated in the
classroom only to a limited extent. First-year students, in particular, would nor-
mally be overwhelmed by frequent attempts to analyze issues from different areas
of the law which are raised by a single transaction, for example, sale of goods or
real property. Unfortunately, segregation has been such a dominant theme of
American legal education that most law students graduate with insufficient ex-
perience in synthesis of related areas. Second and third-year students should be
deliberately exposed to more transactional analysis of legal problems. Transfers
of real estate afford an ideal opportunity for students to experience the reality of
practice where a client expects his lawyer or his firm to handle all but the most
specialized aspects of a single deal. A general practitioner representing a client
in the sale of his home obviously does not tell him that he is a "contract" but not
a "property" lawyer. That segregation in legal education has never been complete
is confirmed by the fact that standard first-year property courses always have
been a mixture of contract and property law. However, missing from these courses
has been any serious consideration of financing and tax aspects of real estate
transactions. The deficiencies in the property education of typical law students
may arise at the level of strict legal problems of financing and also the nonlegal
aspects of the money market. The principal book supplies some fine descriptive
materials on the money market (e.g., the various institutions supplying mortgage
funds) and the structure of the standard financing deal (as tagged by the authors,
the "credit quartet": (1) down payment and loan-to-value ratio, (2) length of
mortgage, (3) rate of interest and (4) rate of amortization). Principal reliance is
placed on textual development of the subject with excerpts from non-case sources.
A few straight legal problems such as prepayment of mortgages and usury are
included.4 The succeeding section of the book deals with the basic security de-
3. The authors in their Preface contemplate that the book could be used for an ad-
vanced course in land transactions where the chapters (other than those on contracts of sale
and title protection) would be stressed. Use of these portions, which amount to approxi-
mately four hundred pages, may be viable for such a course, but the problem of where and
how to cover the excluded materials remains.
4. The choice of materials on usury did not strike this reviewer as ideal. Active problems
in the definition of "interest", e.g., charges for credit reports, appraisals, etc., and creditor
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vices, which again are introduced through textual coverage. Contemporary prob-
lems with installment land contracts and exploitation of blacks and other minority
groups in urban areas are given special treatment. Legal aspects of mortgages are
sampled: open-ended mortgages, "assumption" v. "subject to," special mortgage
take-over problems, and, of course, remedies.5 A question left open by this sec-
tion of the book is whether it is sufficient to replace a complete course in mort-
gages.6 Though the authors would probably disclaim such a purpose, this
reviewer, based upon his experience to date, is inclined to regard this treatment of
mortgages as adequate law school coverage of the subject for most students.
Surely, this book's approach is preferable to the over-emphasis on procedure and
remedies in traditional mortgage courses. It raises some important scope of mort-
gage problems which remind students of the need for care in drafting in an area
of practice permeated with the use of forms. That mortgages is a tough subject
will be confirmed by students (even the best) and teachers using this portion of
the book.
Needless to say, income taxation of real estate transactions is, like mortgages,
an open-ended subject which can only receive illustrative treatment in a single
book on land transfer. On the other hand, the coverage in the principal book is
not superficial, but rather forces students to deal with specific, typical income
tax problems, (e.g., character of income: ordinary v. capital gain,7 deductions,
and timing for reporting gain in installment payment arrangements). Some tax
teachers, sensitive to jurisdictional matters in the law school curriculum, may
resent this intrusion into their usually well-protected territory (non-tax teachers
are often the border patrolmen for this exclusive grant). This reviewer is less
troubled by some duplication in law school coverage, particularly where it re-
sults from secondary treatment in a transactional analysis course. Furthermore,
at least in smaller law schools, the tax and real estate teachers should attempt to
coordinate their instruction, preferably toward the goal of reserving detailed dis-
cussion of the land transfer income tax problems to the transactional course.
Property teachers without a tax background will have to do considerable home-
work before using this section of the book.8
participation in profits, are relegated to a note following a Florida case, of marginal interest,
on intermediaries between borrower and lender. An interesting case on creditor sharing in
profits from the property is Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E. 2d
823 (1971).
5. Surely, there must be a better case on appointment of receivers than WiNngfoot Cal.
Homes Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 74 Ariz. 287, 248 P.2d 738 (1952).
6. Recent books with a principal emphasis on financing of real estate transactions include:
G. Lefcoe, Land Finance Law (1966); N. Penney and R. Broude, Land Financing (1970).
7. The choice of cases here was excellent. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966), docu-
ments an unproductive controversy between taxpayer and government over the general
meaning of the word "primarily" as used in section 1221(1), Internal Revenue Code of
1954; in contrast, Goodman v. United States, 390 F.2d 915 (CL Cl. 1968), compels the
student to deal with a fact pattern rich in details relevant to the ultimate determination of
whether the taxpayer was a "dealer" in real estate.
8. Generally, the number of substantive or typographical errors in the book appears to be
minimal. However, one crept into the discussion of non-recognition of gain in the sale of
residences, which is applicable to purchases within a one-year period before (not beyond)
1972]
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Another subject not found in typical real property books is professional re-
sponsibility. Included here are some excellent current materials on (1) violation
by attorneys of the canons of ethics (e.g., dual representation and solicitation)
and (2) the controversy between the bar and real estate brokers over unlawful
practice. Perhaps no American law school has yet devised a wholly satisfactory
method for coverage of legal ethics. Too often the response has been a nominal
set of lectures which enables the Dean or his delegate to sign the routine certifica-
tion to bar examiners. This reviewer's experience with the principal book suggests
that the general subject should be subdivided and allocated among the substan-
tive law school courses. In other words, each instructor would be expected to
cover and examine in class the ethical problems raised in his area. Coordination
and compliance may discourage this approach, though fragmentation would ap-
pear preferable to many current "efforts" at general coverage of the subject. Pos-
sibly, a required, in-depth course taught by a single instructor will appeal to many
faculties. Unfortunately, active ethical issues are most effectively taught by the
specialists who can contribute insight into the practical aspects. Dual representa-
tion, for example, is not unusual nor necessarily bad in home sales where clients
have legitimately begun to resist charges for nominal and duplicate services in
simple, standardized transactions. In any event, slender coverage of professional
problems remains a major defect of contemporary legal education. Law schools
have to a scandalous extent failed to assume their share of responsibility for in-
stilling a strong commitment to high standards of professional conduct. The "new
youth" now filtering into the country's law schools may be more receptive than
earlier generations to a conscientous effort to confront this particular hypocrisy
in our society.
Coupled with the professional responsibility materials in the book's first chap-
ter is a section on real estate brokerage contracts. Some teachers using this book
may be inclined to delete or skim this section, though brokerage contracts persist
as a source of controversy between parties to real estate transactions.
Beyond the incorporation of these less standard subjects, the principal book
must be appraised for its approach to the traditional conveyancing area. On the
whole, it does a much better job here than most of its competitors. The selection
of topics and the extent of their coverage reflects a balance more appropriate for
contemporary land transactions. A land deal can go sour for many reasons and
not merely for the title defects or encumbrances which tend to dominate the
contract of sale portions of older property volumes. In the principal book, a sub-
stantial portion of the long Chapter III on contracts of sale is devoted to such
problems as financing, quality, and overreaching by buyers. The failure of the
buyer to close because of financing troubles is well represented by a set of Wis-
or after the sale of the old residence. A. Axelrod, C.J. Berger & Q. Johnstone, Land
Transfer and Finance: Cases and Materials 197 n.46 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Axelrod,
Berger & Johnstone]. See also note 16 infra.
9. For example, nearly every edition of the Real Estate Law Report, a new monthly
summary of legal developments in the real estate area (published by Warren, Gorham &
Lamont, Inc., Boston) contains at least one case involving a real estate broker. The principal
book considers some of the reasons for the litigious aspect of brokerage contracts.
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consin cases illustrating the range of financing conditions in land contracts.10
Together with the Chicago Title and Trust form in the appendix, the student
can develop some familiarity with a contract clause which will be specific but
flexible. Though drafting cannot be "taught" in the large classes which unfortu-
nately dominate contemporary legal education, good instructors make an effort
to highlight drafting problems and the alternatives designed to reduce risk of
dispute and, later, litigation. Students should not come out of a property course
(or any other) simply with a rote knowledge of court responses to bad contracts.
The principal book rejects the comfortable assumption that most land transac-
tions involve a transfer of improved property, usually single family residences.
The purchase of unimproved property followed by the search for development
financing and the attendant problem of relating the latter to loans supporting the
land purchase are discussed in a brief note and then illustrated by some California
materials on automatic subordination clauses in original trust deeds."' An ex-
cerpt from a California law review goes behind the legal authorities to examine
the function and abuses inherent in such clauses.
Relief for sellers from "speculators" and "sharpies" is illustrated by cases rang-
ing from a 1905 Arkansas action on behalf of two illiterate black girls to set
aside conveyances on the ground of fraud (unsuccessful), to a 1969 federal class
action regarding unscrupulous practices by real estate men in Chicago's black
neighborhood (successful at the preliminary motion stage). 12 Orthodox property
courses often presume that change in law can be illustrated only by falling back
to the middle ages and the Statute of Uses.
Missing from too many older property books is any consideration of warranty
and tort aspects of real estate transactions, which possibly may flow from a con-
clusion that the quality questions are adequately covered in other courses. One
result has been the traditional preoccupation in real property courses with title
problems. A partial explanation here has been a chilly common law response to
vendee complaints regarding quality of land and improvements, which has only
begun to thaw in serious proportion during the past decade. This is a reminder
that even property teaching materials need to be regularly updated. Even the
principal book focuses almost entirely on warranty developments with only a
passing reference to building codes and other governmental regulations. Hope-
fully, a later edition will pick up some materials on, for example, the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act of 1968,13 which probably came too late for a
1970/1971 book that previously appeared in temporary edition.
The usual subjects of destruction during the executory interval, seller's title
obligations and boundaries, receive compact and interesting treatment. The first
problem is quite adequately presented by a modem Missouri case which discusses
the various rules in the process of determining the disposition of fire insurance
proceeds. 14 The basic marketable title rules (including types of deeds) are covered
10. Axelrod, Berger & Johnstone 240-51.
11. Id. at 252-60.
12. Id. at 325-42.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1970).
14. Axelrod, Berger & Johnstone 342-56.
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largely by authors' notes. 15 The boundaries materials, with two reservations dis-
cussed below, give the students both a good general background on the different
descriptive methods and an opportunity to work through specific situations which
are challenging but not overwhelming. This reviewer experienced no real difficul-
ties guiding his students, with these materials, through this highly technical, er-
ror-prone phase of land transactions. 10 But this section of the book contains no
illustrations, which leaves both teacher and student in the position of studying
geography without the aid of maps. Particularly unfortunate is the failure to in-
clude any examples of the township/section method. This criticism does not
imply that the cases should also include maps because students should be com-
pelled to reconstruct the specific boundary problems. The second drawback is the
inadequate coverage of "practical location" of boundaries under concepts of parol
agreement, acquiescence or estoppel.17 This subject exposes students to accepted
methods for informal resolution of boundary disputes short of litigation.
Authors of real property books must determine the extent to which they will
invade the jurisdiction of their contract colleagues. Such general contract forma-
tion problems as preliminary negotiations, indefiniteness, and significance of "for-
mal contract to follow" were deliberately (and, to this reviewer, appropriately)
given lighter treatment by the authors of the principal book. Some teachers may
object to the inclusion of substantial materials on breach of contract remedies.
This reviewer does not share the possible criticism of "duplicate" coverage for
an area that most students find difficult to understand, particularly the interrela-
tionship of damages, specific performance and rescission. The book includes a fine
set of California materials in which the state supreme court, under the guidance of
Justice Traynor, refined the California law on earnest money contracts and liqui-
dated damages provisions. Here again the depth of coverage is increased by ap-
propriate excerpts from law review articles.18
Title protection receives extensive coverage in another long chapter which most
instructors will probably use selectively in basic conveyancing courses. Detailed
treatment of such items as title plants, title guarantee funds, government regula-
tion of title operations might be omitted or assigned without class coverage.
"Miscellaneous Title Protection Devices" are assigned one hundred pages-ap-
proximately ten percent of the entire book. This will strike many teachers as
excessive coverage for curative acts, marketable title acts, statutes of limitations
and suits to quiet title. Conceding the sorry state of our title system and the de-
pressingly slow pace of revision, many will, nevertheless, doubt the wisdom of
forcing students to wade through this amount of material on these items.
With occasional lapses,1 9 the title protection materials otherwise seem very
15. Id. at 464-76.
16. Id. at 361-406. The description for the tract in example 2 on page 382 appears to
place it west of the Smith property line though the discussion refers to a stake location cast
of the line.
17. Compare 0. Browder, Jr., R. Cunningham & J. Julin, Basic Property Law 769-67
(1966).
18. Axelrod, Berger & Johnstone 271-93.
19. This reviewer has never been enthusiastic regarding the teaching possibilities of the
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good. Heavy reliance is placed on textual coverage, both original and secondary.
The book offers significant exposure to substantive and procedural aspects of title
insurance which can be examined not only through cases but the complete text of
two sample policies. The Torrens registration system is effectively placed after
the recording system and title insurance but before miscellaneous title protection
devices. While some may object to this arrangement, it makes sense historically
because the marketable title acts, curative acts, etc. were largely an attempt, after
the unsuccessful introduction in this country of the Torrens system, to accomplish
minor surgery on the basic recording system. Many students using these title
protection materials will properly develop the view that title assurance is not one
of the glorious chapters in the saga of the American law. Skeptical students will
suspect that, in practice, assumption of risk and, more dubiously, seat-of-the-
pants lawyering is not unusual in this area.
A relatively short chapter on cooperatives and condominiums is dominated and,
in this reviewer's opinion, marred by an unabridged reprinting of lengthy docu-
ments for stock-cooperatives and condominiums (over thirty pages or nearly
half of the entire chapter). For teaching purposes, these materials would appear
to have minimal value unless the instructor supplies independent problems and
requires only selective reading. Otherwise, few students will be motivated to plow
through these documents and instructors will have virtually no sanctions through
the examination process. The subject is completed with a brief note on a federal
tax problem and duplicate coverage of restraints on alienation of cooperative and
condominimum interests.2 0
In the final chapter, complex forms of land finance are represented by excel-
lent materials on shopping center leases, ground leases, leasehold mortgages, sale
and leasebacks, real estate syndication and real estate investment trusts. This
entire unit will probably be deleted if the book is used in a first-year course where
students will find the tax and financing discussion difficult to absorb. Supplemen-
tary materials may be required for use in advanced courses though this book's
coverage is an excellent point of departure. In this reviewer's second-year basic
conveyancing course, exhaustive treatment was obviously not attempted but the
challenge of identifying and solving specific illustrative problems of coordinating
the rights of the various parties to these complicated deals was effectively met.
Perhaps the best segment of this chapter is the portion devoted to sale and lease-
backs, which includes a long excerpt from Professor Cary's fine 1948 article in
the Harvard Law Review (with footnotes on more current developments by the
principal book's authors), and useful tax materials on non-recognition of losses
on sale where it is accompanied by leaseback.
Based upon a single use during the past year, this reviewer strongly recom-
long case on the Minnesota Marketable Title Act, Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Mint. 88, 83
N.W.2d 800 (1957), which also appears in Browder, Cunningham and Julin, supra note 117,
at 922. The chilly response to Torrens registration in the United States may discourage most
instructors from using the long case involving registrar error under the Alberta system,
Canadian Pac. Ry. & Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Turta, [1954] 3 D.L.R. 1 (1954).
20. The reviewer suggests deletion of Gale v. York Center Community Coop. appearing
in Axelrod, Berger & Johnstone 869.
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mends the adoption of the principal book for the purpose of eliminating defi-
ciencies present in older, traditional competitors. In general, topic selection is
more contemporary, and materials are current and more varied. Particularly ap-
pealing is relief from over-reliance on cases which is here supplied by greater use
of law review excerpts or non-legal items. The organization is obvious though not
perfect.21 While, as noted previously, the book covers the full range of general
problems raised by land transactions, the integration experience of students ex-
posed to this book will be incomplete prior to examination unless the teacher
drafts some problems which will force the students to analyze the financing, tax,
property, and contract aspects of a single fact situation. An appendix of sample
forms to implement various phases of land transfers will assist instructors wishing
to highlight drafting alternatives to the problem documents which led to con-
troversy and litigation. Most users of the principal book will graduate with a
more balanced, practical and sophisticated introduction to the important area of
commercial real estate transactions.
JOHN L. PESCHEL*
Black Employment and the Law. By Alfred W. Blumrosen. New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press. 1971. Pp. ix, 416. $15.00.
Black Employment and the Law is an unimportant book about an extremely
important subject. It attempts to deal with the racial and sexual discrimination
that permeate the practices of American business and labor and to analyze
the effect of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'-particularly the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)-in combating that discrimina-
tion. It fails, however, to present a clear picture of the totality or comparative
effectiveness of the legal tools available under the federal law. Much of the
material has been outdated, both by recent court decisions2 and by Congressional
action.3
The book is poorly organized and poorly edited. It pays inordinate attention
21. The seller's obligations regarding title curiously appear as the final section of the
chapter on contracts of sale while other seller and buyer obligations are interspersed through-
out the long chapter. Remedies might be the most appropriate concluding section. Also, one
specific suggestion in the income tax materials: the installment method of reporting gain on
sale of real property is easier to explain if the cash equivalence test, represented by Estate
of Hurlburt, 25 T.C. 1286 (1956), is covered first.
* Professor of Law, Tulane University; Visiting Professor of Law, New York University,
Summer 1972.
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (Supp. 1972).
2. The book is a compilation of essays written by Professor Blumrosen before the fall
of 1969. During 1970 and 1971 the protections provided under Title VII were greatly ex-
tended by a number of important court decisions. See, e.g., cases cited note 6 infra.
3. The Congress recently enacted a basic restructuring of the EEOC which gives the
Commission court enforcement powers and significantly expands its jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e (Supp. 1972).
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to bureaucratic, in-house EEOC debates that hindsight renders unimportant
and that are irrelevant to an understanding of the present law. Pages are
devoted to lively debates about dead issues such as the importance of changing
people's attitudes as compared to making them obey the law, and the negative
effects of the Moynihan Report. Much of the text consists of unsupported
allegations and conclusions-particularly in the sociological realm, while what
hard, legal and factual material is included, is relegated to the footnotes or
appendices.
For example, in the realm of sociological conclusion Blumrosen pontificates:
One of the basic contrasts between the labor movement and the civil rights movement
is the persistence and staying power of the labor movement at all levels of lobbying,
pressuring, and influencing activity .... [I]n comparison with the civil rights move-
ment, the labor movement is sophisticated and consistent. ... The civil rights move-
ment is virtually without theory-or has an embarrassment of them-and lacks staying
power.... It rouses itself as a sleeping giant and takes a symbolic step-a march on
Washington, a riot in a large city-and then falls back to be further disheartened when
nothing happens. Its staying power is low. Its complement of men with expertise is
limited.4
The book traces the historical inadequacy of state measures for combating
employment discrimination, discusses briefly early federal equal opportunity
efforts and then focuses on the role of the EEOC. Blumrosen endorses the 1964-
69 status quo: a weak conciliation agency backed by a private right of action
when conciliation fails.5 His primary thesis appears to be that the EEOC,
because of its very weakness, has greatly advanced the development of anti-
discrimination law in the employment field. Unlike other regulatory agencies
that possess cease and desist powers, the complainant before the EEOC,
Blumrosen argues, can exhaust his administrative remedies easily and painlessly
and thereby gain prompt access to the courts. The courts have been uniquely
receptive to Title VII litigants and, in some instances, have expanded the law
dramatically. 6 Neither corporate nor union discriminators have seriously bothered
4. A.W. Blumrosen, Black Employment and the Law 37-38 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Blumrosen]. This is a misplaced and offensive comparison. Union membership is a lengthy
commitment to joint action for the continued personal and economic benefit of the particular
members. Involvement in the civil rights movement is often temporary, lasting only until a
particular pattern or type of discrimination is removed. In fact, the staying power of the
labor union is due much more to the statutory scheme granting them a guaranteed position
of influence in the development of industrial relations than to the relative charisma of their
leaders, or the sophisticated, philosophical underpinnings of the movement. The Civil
Rights movement can be more fruitfully compared to voluntary organizations whose mem-
bers join together to overcome specific hardships or wrongs, such as the various consumer,
environmental or poverty groups.
5. Id. at 7-9.
6. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1972); Bartmess v. Drervnys USA.,
Inc, 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Caldwell v. National
Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Sanchez v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). The courts have greatly extended the reach of Title VII
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the EEOC because it is a weak agency-unlike more powerful regulatory
bodies which the business and labor interests have traditionally attempted to
capture. The EEOC has, therefore, been free to plod along doing research and
developing new legal concepts for the benefit of the private litigants.
This is an interesting interpretation. However, it is difficult to evaluate
because there is virtually no exploration of the counter thesis: that the im-
portant factor has been the private right of action and a strong EEOC,
coupled with that right of action, could have accomplished twice as much as
the weak agency has. Civil rights leaders and the Congress apparently disagree
with Blumrosen and have opted for the strong agency approach. 7
In the first part of his book, Professor Blumrosen demonstrates the historical
need for Title VII by tracing the early experiences of state regulatory agencies
in dealing with problems of employment discrimination.8 He shows that the
state anti-discrimination agencies, like their federal counterparts in the economic
regulation sphere,9 generally became captives of the interests they were intended
to regulate and chalked up a poor record in terms of expanded employment
opportunities for minorities. 10 Although Blumrosen does not make the connec-
tion, the role of powerful corporations and unions in drafting and controlling
the enforcement (or non-enforcement) of anti-discrimination laws is a repeat-
in the civil rights context--of the history of corporate sabotage of environmental
protection, worker safety, antitrust, and other laws, traced by Jerry Cohen and
Morton Mintz in America, Inc." Unlike Cohen and Mintz, however, who
recommend greater sanctions against corporate law violators,12 Blumrosen
concludes that to prevent the capture of state administrative agencies by busi-
ness and unions, the agencies should not be given strong powers.18
Blumrosen fails to discuss the current status of the state anti-discrimination
agencies or the impact the EEOC has had on them since its creation in 1964.
The Commission provides technical assistance to the state agencies, including
by a process of "creative" judicial interpretation. However, there is no reason to believe that
the judicial activism resulted from or was caused by the lack of EEOC enforcement powers.
7. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
8. Blumrosen 9-23.
9. Id. at 14.
10. The most telling presentation in this regard is a table of "Comparative Complaint
Experience under State Fair Employment Practice Laws", which shows that in 13 states that
enacted such laws, performance from date of enactment to December, 1961, included the
opening of 19,439 cases that resulted in 62 hearings, 26 cease and desist orders, and 18 court
actions. Blumrosen 13, reproducing in part S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964).
11. J. Cohen & M. Mintz, America, Inc. (1971).
12. Id. at 357-77.
13. Blumrosen 8. Blumrosen's recommendations are opposite to those proposed by
Clifford Alexander, former chairman of the EEOC. In testimony before the House Commit-
tee on Education and Labor, Alexander stated: "Job discrimination is a gross form of law-
lessness. To eliminate this lawlessness, the Federal Government should have a strong agency
with the requisite tools and budget to do the job." Hearings on H.R. 6228 and H.R. 13517
Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 129 (1970).
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the training of state personnel and guidance in improving compliance pro-
cedures. These operations have not been overly successful. Most of the state
agencies continue to operate on a level substantially below the level of the
Commission. The Fifth Annual Report of the EEOC states that: "At the
beginning of Fiscal 1970 over 85% of the complaints that had been deferred
to state agencies for investigation ultimately came back to EEOC for
handling."1 4
Blumrosen shows that at the state level, the criminal law approach has been
as ineffective as the administrative/regulatory agency approach. There have
been almost no prosecutions. He attributes the lack of prosecutorial vigor to
the nature of the problem under attack-a "social problem.""' This is mis-
leading. Some social problems that have been labeled as criminal are vigorously
prosecuted-those where the defendants are weak. Good examples are prostitu-
tion, "crossing state lines with intent to incite a riot," and vagrancy. The
criminal laws go unenforced only when the defendants are powerful, and the
sanctions weak in relation to that power.16
After reviewing state experiences in the field of employment discrimination
Blumrosen traces two prevailing official attitudes or philosophies that hindered
effective enforcement of the civil rights laws in the 1960's. The relationship
of these trends to the EEOC is never made dear, but apparently, they affected
the Commission's willingness to exercise its full powers.
The first deterrent to effective enforcement identified by Blumrosen was
the concept that discrimination could best be eliminated by educating the
discriminators and thereby changing their attitudes. 17 This concept, a blatant
but successful tactic for avoiding enforcement of the laws, has been so discredited
that one wonders why a book published in 1971 even deals with it. As Blum-
rosen points out, the "change-their-attitudes" approach places heavy reliance
on voluntarism and reflects great concern for the delicate sensibilities of of-
fenders or discriminators-as opposed to an emphasis on the rights of the
individuals who have been discriminated against.' 8 Blumrosen points to Plans
for Progress, a voluntary association of 100 major corporations who gained
favorable publicity and government endorsement in exchange for pledges not to
discriminate, as epitomizing the "education instead of enforcement" approach. 10
14. 5 EEOC Ann. Rep. 43 (1970). In those jurisdictions where a state anti-discrimination
agency exists, the EEOC is required to defer complaints to the local agency for a period of
60 days. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. 1972).
15. Blumrosen 10.
16. Professor Blumrosen's summary dismissal of criminal sanctions is debatable. The
National Commission on Reform of Federal Laws recommended stronger criminal sanctions,
including personal penalties for corporate violators of a number of laws. National Comm'n
on Reform of Fed. Crim. Laws, Study Draft of a New Fed. Crim. Code 29-34 (1970).
17. Blumrosen 14-19.
18. Id. at 14-15.
19. Id. at 42. An EEOC study of 100 large corporations based in New York concluded:
"While there were individual exceptions, those companies (46) within the 100 which are
signatories of a 'Plan for Progress'-a public posture of affirmative action in minority em-
ployment, utilized minorities in 1966 at a substantially lower rate as a group than the 54
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He could also have pointed to the equally ineffective "affirmative action"
programs of labor unions (which also substituted pledges of good intentions
for law enforcement), or to the proclivity of high-level Justice Department
officials-so well documented by Victor Navasky in Kennedy Justice 0 -- for
treating even the most blatant discriminators as "reasonable men," whom the
government should take infinite pains to persuade-rather than as violators
of the law, as crude and willful as burglars whom the government should
vigorously prosecute.
Blumrosen fails to discuss the inherent weakness of the informal conciliation
procedures followed by the EEOC21 which, in many respects, are only slightly
modified extensions of the education/persuasion approach.2 2
The second deterrent to the enforcement of the laws prohibiting discrimina-
tion in employment was, according to Blumrosen, the attribution by the so-
called Moynihan Report23 and the War on Poverty of the inferior status of
minorities to their "disadvantaged" status in society,24 rather than to institu-
tional racism or discrimination. Blumrosen claims that the "disadvantaged"
explanation was so broad as to be unremediable and that it delayed the defini-
tion of concrete wrongful discriminatory offenses that could be taken into
court and addressed in a specific fashion.25 Blumrosen does not substantiate this.
It is probably unsupportable. The Economic Opportunity Act20 and the Civil
Rights Act of 196427 were passed at roughly the same time. If any relationship
exists between the two, it is more likely that the deflection of national attention
to poverty issues and the subsequent congressional disenchantment with the poor
and their problems provided a smokescreen behind which civil rights attorneys
were able to aggressively develop the law of employment discrimination.
The remaining sections of the book detail the evolution by the EEOC of
administrative regulations and enforcement procedures under Title VII, discuss
companies not party to a comparable public pledge. For example, while nonmembers had 1.2
percent Negroes in positions as officials and managers, Plan members bad only 0.3 percent In
these jobs." EEOC, Hearings on Discrimination in White Collar Employment at 598 (1968),
quoted in Blumrosen 42.
20. V. Navasky, Kennedy Justice 193 (1971).
21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 1972).
22. The book suggests that such procedures are not inherently defective but simply have
not been effectively applied. It is Blumrosen's position that "voluntary" agreements by
business and labor to adhere to civil rights guarantees have great undeveloped potential.
However, the only concrete example of success that Blumrosen cites is the Newport News
Agreement. Blumrosen 328-366. This agreement was hardly voluntary. The cooperation In
the Newport News situation resulted from spectacular pressure by an array of federal
agencies-Justice, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), Defense and EEOC
-threatening jointly-a unique event-to apply their combined powers to insure compliance
with the civil rights laws. The threat of real sanctions, particularly the termination of de-
fense contracts, engendered the "cooperation."
23. Department of Labor, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (1965).
24. See Blumrosen 30-31.
25. Id. at 31-33.
26. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2994d (1970).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-2000h (1970).
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the dimensions of the employment discrimination problem and its most typical
manifestations, and point to some of the remedies fashioned by the EEOC and
the courts. Chapter 3, on the scope of discrimination, is both informative and
shocking28 Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the major manifestations of discrimina-
tion in employment-promotion procedures as defined by seniority systems
and recruitment practices-which have been combatted under Title VII's
broad proscriptions against employment discrimination. In these chapters, it
is sometimes difficult to differentiate between statements that are simply Blum-
rosen on Blumrosen and those that are Blumrosen on the law. Moreover, the
discussion tends to focus on incidents of discrimination directed at particular
individuals, rather than upon the less obvious, systemic problems of discrimina-
tion more recently attacked under Title VII.20
The major quarrel of this reader with Black Employment and the Law is its
lack of clarity in setting forth the overall federal role in combatting discrimina-
tion in employment and the dubiousness of the conclusions it reaches concern-
ing Title VII and the EEOC.
The federal enforcement apparatus as of December, 1971, consisted of the
following five components:
(1) The Attorney General (through the Justice Department's Office of Civil Rights)
who has the power to initiate "pattern or practice suits" in regard to any industry or
union that appears to be characterized by a pattern of employment discrimination.30
Cases are initiated, based on information collected by the Justice Department, by the
EEOC or by other federal agencies. From the Fall of 1967 to the present, the Justice
Department has initiated over 70 lawsuits and joined as amicus in many more. 31
28. According to the book's Preface, "Chapter 3 is an official report of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, prepared under the supervision of Air. Charles Markham."
Blumrosen x. Chapter 3 documents racial and sexual discrimination according to its
regional and industrial distribution. Its report of findings concerning the extent to which
additional educational achievements on the part of Negroes fail to eliminate discrimination
in promotion practices are of particular interest. The study states: "These findings strongly
indicate that more education is only a partial solution to the Negroes' problem of low em-
ployment status because a lessening of the difference in years of schooling between Negroes
and Anglos does not produce a proportional narrowing of the gap in employment status.' Id.
at 127.
29. Court decisions handed down in the past few years have attacked the more difficult
systemic problems. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 US. 424 (1971) (invalidation of
the use of unnecessary and discriminatory testing procedures cloaked as neutral practices);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 404 US.
1006 (1971); Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (Sth Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 US. 919 (1970) (invalidation of seniority systems that appeared color-blind but
actually operated to lock in the victims of past discrimination).
Except for some statistics in Chapter 3, the book totally ignores sex discrimination, an
area of increasing importance under Title VII. No mention is made (again because of the
outdated nature of the subject matter) of such important cases as Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam) (vacating a decision allowing different
hiring policies for women and men having pre-school children).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970).
31. The Department has created an Employment Section within the Civil Rights Division
with over 30 full-time attorneys. Although the Department was initially engaged in a range
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
(2) The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), which is located within
the Department of Labor. It is responsible for securing compliance with national anti-
discrimination employment policy on the part of businesses and unions that (1) contract
with the federal government or (2) engage in federally assisted construction contracts.
The OFCC has the power to: cancel contracts, debar contractors from future federal
contracts, and publicly list noncomplying contractors.
3 2
(3) The Civil Service Commission which is responsible for implementing national
policy, as articulated in Executive Orders3 3 concerning fair employment practices for
the federal government. The Commission provides leadership to other federal agencies,
reviews their performance and administers a system of hearings for aggrieved federal
personnel.3 4
(4) The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 35 which is a five-man, presi-
dentially appointed commission, empowered to combat discrimination on the part of
all employers and unions with 25 or more employees or members, as well as discrimina-
tion by union hiring halls and employment agencies.8 0 The Commission has the
authority to: provide technical assistance for the elimination of discrimination; to
produce studies concerning the causes and manifestation of discrimination; to hold
hearings; to investigate charges of discrimination; and, after a finding of "reasonable
cause" to negotiate conciliation agreements that attempt to eliminate the complained of
discrimination. The Commission is substantially involved in litigation through the
participation of its General Counsel's office.8 7
(5) Private right of action. If the Commission fails to act within 60 days or is
unable to obtain voluntary compliance by the employer or union charged with dis-
of suits of varying significance in terms of number of potential beneficiaries, it is presently
targeting its effort to major industries with (a) a large number of employers and (b) sub-
stantial discrimination against minority employees. In 1971, the 12 pattern or practice suits
filed by the Department challenged practices by defendants who employed over 65,000
people.
32. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 209 (1972), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000c (1970).
33. Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. § 432 (1972), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000c (1970).
34. 34 Fed. Reg. 5368, 5370 (1969). The current law gives federal employees a private
right of action under Title VII after exhausting civil service proceedings. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-16(c) (Supp. 1972).
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(a) (Supp. 1972).
36. The EEOC originally did not have jurisdiction over the employment practices of
federal, state or local government agencies, with the exception of state employment services.
Nor did it have jurisdiction over employment practices in private clubs and Indian tribes, or
over the employment of individuals performing educational functions. 42 U.S.C. § 20000
(1970). Amendments enacted in March 1972 eliminated most of these exceptions and
gave the EEOC jurisdiction over most employers and unions with 25 or more employees
during the first year after its enactment and 15 or more employees thereafter. 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2000e(b), (d), (e) (Supp. 1972).
37. As noted in note 3 supra the current law gives the EEOC court enforcement powers.
During fiscal year 1971, the General Counsel participated in 436 cases, a fourfold increase
since 1969. Court decisions have frequently relied heavily on the legal and factual arguments
advanced by the EEOC. See, e.g., Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044




crimination, the individual aggrieved may file a civil action in federal district court.38
The court may appoint an attorney for the plaintiff and can waive costs; attorneys'
fees can be collected from the defendant upon a finding of guilt. The courts are
empowered to, and have awarded broad remedies, including substantial back-pay,:3
where discrimination has been proven. The grounds for private challenges to dis-
crimination have been expanded beyond Title VII to include an independent action
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.40
Of the five methods for combatting employment discrimination discussed
above, the private right of action-particularly in the class action form-has
unquestionably been the most effective.41 The courts have recognized Title VII
complainants as "private attorneys general," performing a quasi public func-
tion.42 The private cases have given content to the provisions of Title VII in
a manner that the EEOC-because of the statutory limitations on its power-
has not been able to. They have consistently provided "the major impetus for
progress in the field of civil rights,"43 and have opened up new directions under
the law that the government has subsequently followed. Equally important,
the cases have provided concrete assistance to thousands of litigants. In the
courts, the minority complainants are given the parity of bargaining power
that is generally lacking in EEOC or administrative proceedings. Moreover,
during an administration notorious for its backsliding in the enforcement of
equal opportunity goals, the private right of action has assured consistent,
uninterrupted application of the law.44
38. Under the present law the Commission is given 180 days in which to act. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. 1972).
39. Id. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. 1972). The court is now limited to a maximum award of
two years back pay. Id. The federal courts may "enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful practices, and other such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay .... " Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1970). See, e.g., Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 FAd
1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. I.T.&T., 438 F.2d 757
(3d Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Workers, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 911 (1970). These cases follow the United States Supreme Court finding in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), that 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which was derived
from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, prohibits acts of private, as well as state discrimination.
The 1981 decisions make it unnecessary to first exhaust EEOC administrative proceedings,
but permit the court to require EEOC conciliation efforts where appropriate.
41. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
42. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
43. Hearings on S. 2515, S. 2617, and H.R. 1746 Before the Senate Subcom. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., at 63 (1971) (state-
ment of Vrffliam H. Brown, II, Chairman, EEOC).
44. NAACP, Inc. Fund Attorney William L. Robinson testified in hearings on H. 6228
and H.R. 13517 in favor of retaining a private right of action: "It is important that black
communities maintain confidence in the legal system as something that they and their lawyers
can invoke, even if a government agency will not.... Their rights to state their case and
bring it before federal courts with their lawyers are the basis of assurance against cynicism
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Black Employment and the Law deals extensively only with the EEOC, failing
to measure its weaknesses against the gains that have been or should be achieved
by other federal enforcement avenues or, more importantly, by private litigation.
As the above discussion has shown, in terms of resources and accomplishments,
the EEOC is only one small segment of the total federal enforcement apparatus.
The book also fails to take cognizance of the consistent and successful attempts
of the EEOC's General Counsel's office to bolster private litigants' position
through amicus briefs, making available facts and research developed by the
EEOC staff. Further, some of Blumrosen's conclusions concerning the major
strengths and contributions of the Commission are highly questionable. Five
of his theses deserve attention:
(1) The EEOC has developed effective tools for the collection of data on
discriminatory practices.45 It is indisputable that EEO-1 (the form which the
EEOC requires employers to file) and EEO-3 (the form which unions must file)
have created an effective data base for government enforcement efforts. However,
it is disputable whether the EEOC has itself done or has been able to persuade
its counterparts, the Justice Department, the OFCC, and others to do all that is
within the federal powers to act upon the data, once it is collected. Most critics
feel that the federal government has been less than vigorous in pursuing em-
ployers and unions with poor records. The EEOC statistical analyses have, how-
ever, as Blumrosen points out, been put to effective use by private litigants.40
EEOC-developed statistical analyses have been recognized by the courts as
important tools of proof.47
(2) The EEOC has developed important techniques for assisting employers
and unions to combat discrimination.8 The Commission's technical assistance
role has been limited in scope and has generally not been effective unless in-
corporated into the law by the decisions of federal courts. In one field, the
validation of qualifying tests and exams, the Commission has made an impor-
tant and meaningful contribution. EEOC-developed standards4  were trans-
lated into law and given force by the U.S. Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
developing in the black community concerning enforcement of the law."1 1 Hearings on H.R.
6228 and H.R. 13517 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Edu-
cation and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 95, 96 (1970).
45. Blumrosen 27.
46. Id. at 47. The efficacy of private actions is demonstrated, in part, by the fact that the
Chamber of Commerce-American Retail Federation sponsored Erlenborn Amendment (re-
portedly drafted by an attorney for Sears Roebuck) that passed the House of Representa-
tives in 1971, attacked many of the results achieved by private suits. The bill proposed to
prohibit class action suits under Title VII, limit back pay recoveries for aggrieved individuals
to two years prior to the filing of a lawsuit, and make Title VII the exclusive federal remedy
for private civil suits-barring reliance on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the National Labor
Relations Act or other laws.
47. See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971), and cases cited therein.
48. Blumrosen 262-65.
49. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Guidelines on Employee Selection Proce-
dures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 to .14 (1972).
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Power Company.50 The Court ruled that section 703 (h) of the Civil Rights Act
of 196451 permits only such testing as is directly related to the individual's com-
petence for the specific job sought, and that general ability tests may not be
used to exclude minorities-regardless of the nondiscriminatory intent, unless
the direct relationship between test performance and job performance is proven.02
(3) The EEOC has developed a conciliation process that gives minorities
equal bargaining powers in dealing with discriminating employers and unions.ra
Professor Blumrosen claims that by involving minority-complainants in the
conciliation process and, particularly by requiring them to sign the conciliation
agreement, the EEOC has placed them on a parity with employers and unions 5"
This interpretation would be correct if the EEOC operated as the advocate of
the complainant. More often, the Commission conciliators serve as mediators
between the complainant and the alleged discriminator rather than assuming an
adversary relationship towards the discriminator. And, of course, the alleged
"parity" is greatly weakened by the offender's knowledge that the Commission
has no power to enforce the conciliation agreement once it has been signed.55
The achievement of equality in a power vacuum is probably not very important.
(4) The Commission has contributed substantially to the elimination of dis-
criminatory practices through its informal negotiation and agreement proce-
dures.56 Blumrosen's own statistics and the annual reports of the EEOC show
that the disparities between job opportunities for whites and blacks have not
narrowed significantly. The number of complaints filed annually with the EEOC
has increased substantially-rather than decreasing or leveling off. If the Com-
mission is judged by the success of its conciliation efforts, its chief contribution
to improving the status of minority employees may well be the relatively prompt
exhaustion of administrative remedies which paves the way to a private civil
suit.
The EEOC received more than 52,000 charges during the first five years of
its existence. Of that number, 35,445 were recommended for investigation. Fol-
lowing these investigations, the Commission found reasonable cause to believe
that discrimination had taken place in over 63% of the cases. Despite these
findings, the Commission failed in over half of these cases to achieve a totally
50. 401 US. 424 (1971).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
52. 401 U.S. at 436.
53. Blumrosen 95-101, 149-151.
54. Blumrosen states: "By requiring their (the charging parties'] signatures, we opened a
new chapter in the history of race relations." Id. at 95. "Multi-lateral bargaining is quite
possibly one of the ways of the future in resolving the increasingly more complex disputes
within our society." Id. at 97. Both of these conclusions are greatly exaggerated, considering
the results achieved.
55. At least one conciliation agreement has been signed where the employer granted the
Commission a right to sue under the agreement, should it be violated. This provision has
not yet been tested. Interview with Robert Wallace, Esq., former EEOC attorney, Jan. 1972.




or even partially successful conciliation agreement.57 Many of the successful
agreements were violated. During fiscal 1970, the Commission reported that It
received 20,310 complaints of discrimination, 4,045 investigations were com-
pleted and 613 conciliations reached,O and "the corresponding figures for suc-
cessful conciliations also showed a decline."' 0
There have, unquestionably, been situations where the intervention of the
Commission has improved hiring practices. But major corporations have fre-
quently refused to negotiate in good faith or have flouted the terms of concilia-
tion agreements. In fact, in Blumrosen's entire text, the only victory against a
major corporation that he cites is the Newport News agreement.60 Furthermore,
this agreement was reached only after the OFCC threatened to cut off the
shipyard's defense contracts and the Justice Department suggested that a
pattern or practice suit might be warranted. 0'
(5) The Commission has played in the past and will be able to play in the
future a more effective role because of its lack of hearing and decision powers.0 2
Blumrosen feels that the weakness of the Commission has allowed it to survive
attacks from and efforts to control by business and unions, leaving the task of
defining the law to private litigants-buttressed, of course, by EEOC expertise.
This writer is in complete disagreement with Blumrosen's advocacy of a weak
EEOC. There is no question that private litigation has been widespread and
effective, that it has greatly served the victims of discrimination by bringing
concrete relief and the public by defining the law.63 Nor is there any question
that the federal government, since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,04
has made progress in defining the nature and measuring the pervasiveness of
employment discrimination. A substantial body of expertise has been developed
on the subject and some strong actions have been initiated against discriminatory
businesses and unions. But, measured by results achieved and jobs obtained,
progress has been slow; only a small dent has been made in the problem. The
achievement of equal employment opportunity would be substantially acceler-
ated if the efforts of private litigants were supplemented by strong EEOC en-
forcement powers. An EEOC with cease and desist powers would provide a
prompter remedy to supplement lengthy court procedures. It would allow over-
all planning and direction that the necessarily ad hoc efforts of private litigants
lack. Equally important, it would demonstrate a national commitment to enforce
57. Democratic Study Group, Fact Sheet 92-12, Aug. 16, 1971, at 4.
58. 5 EEOC Ann. Rep. 35-36 (1970).
59. Id. at 34.
60. Blumrosen 328-66.
61. See note 22 supra.
62. Blumrosen 7-9.
63. In fact the provision of a private remedy has provided an indispensable guarantee
that the executive will not frustrate the promises made by the Congress (and an Important
aspect of that guarantee has been the provision of attorney's fees, giving the victims of
discrimination the wherewithal to take on major commercial interests). 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
5(k) (Supp. 1972).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-2000h (1972).
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anti-discrimination policies that in itself should have an impact on discrim-
inating employers and unions.
The anti-discrimination laws have been neither adequately enforced nor
obeyed. Blumrosen is willing to accept this and to hold the various responsible
agencies to a strict standard. He suggests that the success of the anti-discrimina-
tion agencies must be measured by gains in the marketplace, specifically: the
ratio of minority unemployment to white unemployment in all crucial cate-
gories.6 5 Yet, despite the hard evidence concerning the dismal record of the
present federal enforcement mechanisms in meeting that standard, Blumrosen
continues to endorse the conceptual structure of a weak conciliating agency
complemented by overlapping and only slightly stronger federal agencies and
by an individual right of action. By the test of more than five years of actual
performance, this is not enough. The logical choice for the past few years has
been to retain the private right of action alone, relegating the EEOC solely to
a research and technical assistance function, or to build the EEOC into an
agency with real powers, that truly supplements the efforts of private litigants.
Fortunately, the Congress has chosen the latter course. This is an important
step forward. If it is followed by an aggressive commitment by the federal
government to exercise all the powers it possesses for combatting employment dis-
crimination, the goals articulated by Title VII may eventually be realized.
SARAH COLLINS CAREY*
The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy-The Twilight of the GATT?
By John W. Evans. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1971. Pp. x, 383.
$13.95.
At a time when the United States is undergoing a drastic reappraisal of its
objectives and accomplishments in the field of world trade, nothing could be more
beneficial than a careful historical perspective of the etiology and development
of U.S. trade policy. Mr. Evans' book, although at times somewhat too thorough
for all but the most serious student of foreign trade policy, is most valuable as an
overview of the rise and fall of free trade in the last forty years. While the
focus is on the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations in the early sixties, this
merely highlights the inherent obstacles to successful multi-national trade
negotiations that have existed for some time and which have led us to the brink
of international economic crisis today.
In Evans' view, the failure of the trading nations of the world to develop a
sane and progressive approach to trade negotiations centers around one concept:
"reciprocity". Trade negotiations are no more than a sophisticated game of
diplomatic horsetrading, with economic factors less important to the participants
than gamesmanship. Thus high tariffs have achieved an intrinsic value as a
bargaining weapon to be traded in future encounters for various concessions.
65. Blumrosen 23-27.
* Assistant Director, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.
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Since there will be less in the cupboard to trade, every reduction in tariffs is
viewed by the countries as a loss of future leverage in bargaining. Evans astutely
observes:
Tariffs that have no intrinsic economic value for the country that maintains them have
acquired value because of the insistence of other countries on reciprocity in the 'bar-
gaining process.'
This observation would be passed off as simply an astute insight into the foibles
of the human species, wherein the shadow of power often has more value than
the substance of economic well-being, were it not for the grave economic con-
sequences that result. For the high tariffs, maintained as a bargaining tool,
result in higher prices to the consumers in the country maintaining them and
often result in a decrease in real income for the country as a whole. Although
Evans unfortunately does not focus on the impact on the consumer, he does
acknowledge this problem. He notes:
Once it is recognized that governments attach value to tariffs for the bargaining power
they represent, there is no need to assume that the levels of existing tariffs reflect their
judgment of the margin of protection required for maximum collective satisfaction.
Tariff levels may be maintained in spite of the fact that a lower level would raise the
country's real income.2
Until recently no one has measured the effect of tariffs and trade restrictions
on the consumer. However, a recent study by C. Fred Bergsten, formerly on the
staff of the National Security Council, indicates that the cost to consumers may
exceed 15 billion dollars yearly, or $300 per family.3 Thus it becomes clear that
high tariffs that have no economic basis are really tragically self-defeating.
Moreover, even when there is a purported economic basis, such as severe foreign
competition with a struggling domestic industry, tariffs are not the most rational
way to deal with the problem. Evans, for example, points out that:
Any transfer of income that can be effected by tariffs could in theory be accomplished
more directly, without incurring the same risk of reduced efficiency. Where, for exam-
ple, all political parties agree that it is desirable to improve the lot of unemployed coal-
miners, it would probably be less costly to the economy to pay them a subsidy until
they can find other employment than to stimulate demand for coal by restricting im-
ports of petroleum. 4
Perhaps the most illuminating and disturbing aspect of the book deals with
the failure of the GATT5 to fulfill its purpose as a vehicle for world wide
cooperation towards the elimination of trade barriers. The inherent weakness of
1. J.W. Evans, The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy-The Twilight of the
GATT? 31 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Evans].
2. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
3. C. Bergsten, The Cost of Import Restrictions to American Consumers 4 (1972). See
also Remarks by Andrew F. Brimmer before the Foreign Policy Ass'n, Feb. 16, 1972, at
22-23.
4. Evans 27-28.
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, adopted Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (effective Jan. 1, 1948).
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the GATT goes back to its very inception when a "Protocol of Provisional Ap-
plication" was included under which each government committed itself to
carrying out Part II of the GATT only insofar as "not inconsistent with
existing legislation."0 Since the charter was never ratified, all contracting
parties still apply the agreement subject to this qualification. Therefore, those
restrictive trade practices in force prior to January 1948 have not been affected.
Perhaps equally as significant is the fact that violations of the GATT by con-
tracting parties have generally been permitted with little or no reaction. Canada,
the United Kingdom and most recently the United States have all imposed
import surcharges without waivers from the GATT.' In the majority of cases
such violations have been condoned because other contracting parties have
either committed similar violations themselves or anticipated doing so in the
future.
Many of the inherent weaknesses of the GATT did not really become ap-
parent until the Kennedy Round. Ironically, the Kennedy Round was thus both
the climax and denouement of the GATT approach to trade. For it soon became
apparent that despite the unprecedented negotiating power granted to the U.S.
President by the Trade Expansion Act of 19628 and the noble commitments of
the contracting states, the obstacles to a complete disarmament of trade barriers
could not be overcome. There are several reasons for this that are explored by
Evans. First and perhaps foremost was the growth of preferential trading blocs,
notably the European Common Market (EEC). The GATT philosophy of
multilateral negotiations on a most favored nation basis required a commitment
to nondiscrimination among the contracting parties. The EEC, however, created
its own preferential trading system among member states. This was soon
emulated by the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and numerous
smaller alliances such as the Arab Common Market. The result of this phe-
nomenon was a growth of free trade within preferential groups with a con-
comitant increase in trade barriers between the trading blocs and non-members.
A second problem that became apparent during and after the Kennedy Round
was the futility of negotiating tariff reductions without insuring that they would
not be replaced by non-tariff barriers which would accomplish the same result.
For example, the U.S. currently has reduced its tariffs to the lowest level in
recent history. However, protectionist sentiment and political pressure have
resulted in a toughening of the enforcement of customs laws, especially in the
area of anti-dumping. The Treasury Department, which is responsible for ap-
prehending narcotics smugglers, counterfeiters and tax evaders has now
become the chief arbiter of international trade. By tightening or loosening its
enforcement of customs regulations, trade can either be encouraged or dis-
couraged. The dangers of allowing world trade to be controlled by customs
officials was recognized by Evans, who observed:
6. Id., pt. 6, at A2051, T.IA.S. No. 1700 at 2041, 55 U.N.T.S. at 308.
7. J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT 712-13 (1969); see Presidential
Proclamation No. 4074, 3 C.F.R. 80 (Supp. 1971).
8. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-991 (1970).
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Who is more familiar than a customs official with the maze of regulations created by
governments to insure that duties are fully paid, statistics collected, and the health,
safety, and morals of the citizenry protected? Why should he not conclude that his
government's intent was to reduce trade to a minimum and, accordingly, do his patriotic
bit toward that end?9
Yet this is only one of many ways that the letter and spirit of the GATT
have been violated by contracting parties. "Voluntary restraint programs" have
successfully been used to avoid the prohibitions on quotas. The U.S. has success-
fully restrained trade in steel and textiles in this manner, although technically
without violating the GATT. Similarly the variable import levies of the EEC on
agricultural products do not explicitly violate any provision of the GATT but
have resulted in the insulation of one of the world's largest agricultural markets
from price competition.
If there is a general conclusion in Evans' book it is that the outlook for freer
world trade in the years to come is uncertain and that any new advances will
have to be made through a reworking of the basic GATT concepts. The picture
is not a particularly hopeful one. Evans points out that the U.S., caught in an
inflationary crisis which is largely the by-product of the war in Indo-China, is
unlikely to initiate trade liberalizations in the near future. Similarly, the EEC,
which is now expanding its membership, will have little incentive to seek a re-
newal of open multilateral trade. Finally, the less developed nations, whose in-
fluence on the world scene is increasing, appear to be interested not in genuine
free trade but merely in protecting their domestic industries while obtaining ac-
cess to markets in richer countries. If Evans' gloomy forecast is correct, we can
anticipate continued world economic instability and an overall decline in world
prosperity with nations and regional groups seeking to maximize their own wel-
fare with little concern for the fate of other nations. This is not dissimilar to the
events that led to the depression of the thirties and the World War that fol-
lowed.
Ironically, it is the United States that has generally considered world eco-
nomic stability as the quid pro quo for the development of the democratic capi-
talist system that we wish to spread. We have seen fit to defend other nations
of the world with soldiers and billions of dollars in military aid, which, in itself,
has led to balance of payment difficulties. But we are not apparently now will-
ing to export our dollars in the interest of maintaining stable world trade, even
though this would support our long range political interests. If a new initiative
towards reducing trade barriers is to come from within the United States it will
have to result from a number of important changes. A decrease in our military
involvement abroad would undoubtedly stem the largest source of the dollar
drain and inflation and place the United States in a position to once more resume
leadership in the trade area. Moreover, an increased awareness by consumers
that protectionism is paid for out of their pocketbooks may result in new politi-
cal and social pressure both here and abroad to undertake new trade initiatives.
LEsLI. ALAN GLICK*
9. Evans 87-88.




Mental Disability and the Criminal Law. By Arthur R. Matthews, Jr.
Chicago: American Bar Foundation. 1970. Pp. xi, 209. $3.50.
The written rule of law frequently is modified and altered before it emerges
as a rule of everyday practice. Most lawyers would probably agree with this
thesis in the absence of supporting data. But if proof of this written law-applied
law dichotomy is needed, it is certainly provided by Mr. Matthews in his work
entitled Mental Disability and the Criminal Law. This "law in action" study
was conducted by the American Bar Foundation and pertains to an area of law
of immediate concern to most citizens, whether waving the banners of Law and
Order or simply observing highly publicized trials.
The author's introductory comments explain that his work is based upon a
field study which occurred during 1963 and 1964 and which concentrated on
criminal law practices in the District of Columbia and major urban centers in
California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan and New York. The nature and purpose
of the study is stated simply: to observe how various officials involved in the
mentally disturbed person's encounter with the criminal law actually perceive
and implement the written rules of law; and to improve the workings of the
criminal justice system by concentrating on and thereby exposing the "practical
operations" of the system. To the extent that myriad deficiencies were revealed
and examined, and to the extent that constructive ameliorative proposals were
articulated, the study satisfied its objectives. Whether the system of criminal
justice and the mentally ill will thereby be improved, however, remains to be
seen.
The scope and breadth of the book can best be stated by highlighting the
six chapters, all of which were clearly written and organized coherently. The
first chapter conveniently provides the reader with a brief review of existing
legal standards relating to the insanity defense and competency to stand trial.
In contrast to this segment's emphasis on the current state of the law, the re-
mainng chapters catalog and articulate the results of the field study augmented
by specific recommendations for improvement.
Chapter Two is devoted to the insanity defense in criminal cases. Buttressed
by empirical evidence, it is established that assertion of the plea is infrequent
because it is usually raised only in violent, capital cases in which it is the
"only real defense."' One reason for this, which may not be obvious to
laymen-and I daresay some lawyers-is the dispositional consequence of
proving insanity: a lengthy stay in a maximum security institution frequently
under conditions which invite the question whether the term "insane" applies
more to the operational procedures than the patients allegedly being treated.
Mr. Matthews sets forth pertinent statistical data, details myriad procedural
disadvantages of asserting the defense and analyzes the unique features of the
1. It will be interesting to observe whether this contention is borne out under the
recent decision by the California Supreme Court holding that the death penalty is cruel and
unusual punishment. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152
(1972). Similarly, the capital punishment decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), should, according to this argument, have some effect upon the
frequency with which the insanity defense is asserted.
1972]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
D.C. practice (under the Durham2 rule) insofar as better mental health-care
facilities and use of the defense in misdemeanor cases-a practice unheard of in
most jurisdictions.
Competency to stand trial, the subject of an important but commonly un-
publicized stage in criminal proceeding, is explored in the next two chapters.
Matthews cites numerous practices which support his charge that the competency
proceeding is actually a vehicle for sought-after dispositional consequences.
First, the formal criminal trial can be side-tracked via a finding of incompetency,
the result of which is institutionalization for the accused. Second, the competency
procedure serves as a discovery device: initiation of the proceeding results in
access to psychiatric testimony, a tactical maneuver which can be favorable to
both prosecution and defense. Finally, Matthews charges that trial judges have
failed to clearly apprise expert witnesses of the precise matters under investiga-
tion at competency proceedings. This, it is argued, is the primary reason that
psychiatrists are confused as to (1) the purpose for which they are testifying
and (2) the content of the legal standard for competency.
Chapter Five, concerning restoration to competency, concisely sets forth a
number of conclusions and recommendations which mirror the rather bleak
picture facing an institutionalized defendant desiring a speedy return to society.
It is urged by the author, for example, that if a defendant is adjudged incom-
petent to stand trial, his commitment should be predicated upon a plan of
treatment showing reasonable promise of early restoration; otherwise, he should
be institutionalized under the civil commitment alternative discussed in the
final chapter. Additionally, an incompetency commitment should be limited to
a stated period of time (12 to 18 months), after which time the case should be
reconsidered. This proposal, and many others, while limited to the criminal con-
text, might well be appropriately applied to all cases of involuntary commitment.
The last chapter discusses civil commitment of the mentally ill. Despite the
apparent contradiction between this topic and the book's title, its inclusion was
necessary for a complete coverage of mental disability and the criminal law. For,
as Matthews emphasizes, civil commitment is used extensively in all of the
studied jurisdictions as another device by which society can clear the streets
of social misfits without the concomitant burdens of criminal law procedural
niceties. The author devotes most of the chapter to describing various police-
initiated and court-initiated commitment practices. By so concentrating on
pragmatic considerations, however, Matthews neglected to effectively respond
to the hard philosophical questions frequently raised in this context (e.g.,
Should police be allowed to avoid the restrictions of a formal criminal trial by
employing civil commitment to remove an undesirable, yet "innocent" person
from society? If civil commitment results in long-term institutionalization,
should basic constitutional freedoms be applied to such proceedings? Should any
person be institutionalized against his will in the absence of an overt, anti-
social act?). Admittedly, some of these inquiries may have been beyond the
scope of the study; nevertheless, it seems reasonable that some effort should
2. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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have been made to at least acknowledge the existence of these and other trouble-
some questions.
The book's conclusion succinctly articulates some of the important findings
of the study: the weight and notability of the insanity defense are exaggerated;
competency to stand trial is a critical stage of a criminal case because of dis-
covery possibilities and dispositional consequences; civil commitment provides
a legal basis for removing the criminal defendant-sometimes even a minor
offender-from society; there is a severe shortage of resources to deal with the
numerous facets of the mentally disturbed person's confrontation with the crim-
inal law; and there is poor communication and conflict of purpose between the
various agencies routinely involved in these cases. In response to these exposed
deficiencies, the author calls for greater cooperation between criminal and medi-
cal agencies, increased resources on all fronts and improved techniques for the
in-court presentation of expert psychiatric evidence.
The results, appraisals and recommendations thus far outlined are clear-cut,
reasonable and relatively uncontroversial. But can the same be said for
Matthews' final observation that there is no need to abolish the insanity defense?
Indeed, does it not seem odd that our system of jurisprudence sanctions the legal
treatment of the mentally disturbed within the realm of criminal law when the
fundamental issue may more accurately be described in terms of medical
care and treatment of the mentally ill? Matthews brushes aside the suggestion
of abolishing the defense in the following fashion:
Critics of the defense of insanity have to supply some acceptable alternative rationale
[concept of blameworthiness] for the criminal law if they are to make the case for
abolishing the defense of insanity.3
Yet seven years prior to this book, Professors Goldstein and Katz, in a thought-
provoking challenge to this position, argued that the notion of blameworthiness
and abolition of the defense are not mutually exclusive concepts.4 To summarize
their position, they maintained that society's affirmative case against an accused
obligates the state to prove that the defendant committed the alleged unlawful
act and that he possessed the requisite "criminal intent."5 Failure to prove each
and every element results in a judicial determination of not guilty. Thus an ac-
cused who desires to defend on the basis of no "criminal intent"-whether he be
sleepwalking at the time of the crime or suffering from some mental disability-
simply offers evidence to disprove the existence of intent. Such an approach is
consistent with our common law tradition of blameworthiness and yet need not
entail the "insanity defense" as a clearly identifiable affirmative defense which
must be proven by the accused.
If this hypothesis is true, then why was the defense of insanity manufactured
and why does it remain a crystallized doctrine of criminal law? According to
Goldstein and Katz, insanity is not really a defense, but rather serves as a device
3. A. Matthews, Jr., Mental Disability and the Criminal Law 198-99 (1970).
4. Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"--Why Not?, 72 Yale L.J. 8S3
(1963).
5. As used, this description satisfies Mattbews' qola~pt of blameworthiness.
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for restraining people who are feared by society and yet have actually committed
no crime:
Though unpleasant to acknowledge, the insanity defense is an expression of uneasiness,
conscious or unconscious, either about the adequacy of such material elements ... as
"mens rea" . . . for singling out those who ought to be held criminally responsible, or
it is an expression of concern about the adequacy of civil commitment procedures
to single out from among the "not guilty by reason of insanity" those who are mentally
ill and in need of restraint.6
In light of this reasoning, it is altogether possible that the existing insanity
practice could be replaced with the following scheme. A defendant claiming to
be suffering from a mental disease or defect to such an extent as to negate the
intent element of a criminal offense is entitled to a verdict of not guilty-just as
if the commission of the physical act had been disproved. Where, however, during
the course of the criminal proceeding it becomes reasonably doubtful that defen-
dant's mental state is normal and well-balanced, defendant must undergo psy-
chiatric examination under the civil commitment procedure. Such a proposal
presupposes the abolition of the insanity defense but maintains the protective
and rehabilitative features of the existing "defense" under a more rational
scheme. While a hypothetical case under this alternative would be entirely con-
sistent with the "fault" rationale of criminal law, the end result (commitment
to a mental institution) could be attained under a vigorous, well-staffed and
adequately funded civil commitment program. Obviously, this suggestion may be
less than ideal, and perhaps no better than the existing system, but few would
assert that it abrogates the core concept-blameworthiness---of criminal law.
Aside from this consideration, which deserves serious study, Matthews' work
offers keen insights into the plight of the mentally ill criminal defendant and
makes a valuable contribution to a pressing and long-standing societal problem.
The inadequacies and shortcomings so neatly outlined in this book bespeak the
need for immediate improvement. But without conscientious men willing and
able to tackle these problems, and, similarly, an attitudinal change of our citizens
from retribution to rehabilitation, Matthews' pleas may go unheeded. It is indeed
a cruel paradox that this work may fall prey to the very kind of evil that it
exposed: express rules (and books) do not always translate into meaningful
results.
DoNALD J. HALL*
6. Goldstein and Katz, supra note 4, at 868.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
